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1. INTRODUCTION
What I am going to describe for you is a revolution in macroeconomics, a
transformation in methodology that has reshaped how we conduct our science.
Prior to the transformation, macroeconomics was largely separate from the
rest of economics. Indeed, some considered the study of macroeconomics
fundamentally different and thought there was no hope of integrating 
macroeconomics with the rest of economics, that is, with neoclassical economics.
Others held the view that neoclassical foundations for the empirically deter-
mined macro relations would in time be developed. Neither view proved
correct.
Finn Kydland and I have been lucky to be a part of this revolution, and my
address will focus heavily on our role in advancing this transformation. Now,
all stories about transformation have three essential parts: the time prior to
the key change, the transformative era, and the new period that has been 
impacted by the change. And that is the story I am going to tell: how macro-
economic policy and research changed as the result of the transformation of
macroeconomics from constructing a system of equations of the national 
accounts to an investigation of dynamic stochastic economies.
Macroeconomics has progressed beyond the stage of searching for a theory
to the stage of deriving the implications of theory. In this way, macroeconomics
has become like the natural sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, though,
macroeconomics involves people making decisions based upon what they
think will happen, and what will happen depends upon what decisions they
make. This means that the concept of equilibrium must be dynamic, and – as
we shall see – this dynamism is at the core of modern macroeconomics.
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ed macroeconomics is applicable to the study of virtually all ﬁelds of econom-
ics. In fact, the meaning of the word macroeconomics has changed to refer to
the tools being used rather than just to the study of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
As a result of the transformation, these are exciting times in macroeconom-
ics. The methodology that Finn and I developed for the study of business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations is being used to advance learning not only in the area 
of business cycles but also in virtually all areas of economics. By using this
methodology, researchers are able to apply theory and measurement to 
answer questions, deﬁne puzzles, and determine where better measurement
is needed before speciﬁc questions can be answered.
Over the last ﬁve years, I have addressed the following questions using this
methodology: What is the fundamental value of the stock market, and do fun-
damentals account for the large movements in the value of the stock market
relative to gross domestic product that have occurred over time? Why did
hours worked per adult fall by one-third in Western Europe, and not in
Canada and the United States, in the 1970–1995 period? Why were market
hours in the United States at the end of the 1990s 5 percent above what theory
predicts? Why did Japan lose a decade of growth beginning in 1992, a decade
when growth was at trend in the other advanced industrial countries?
Much of this recent research originates from my undergraduate teaching
that began in the late 1990s. Until then, I had never taught a course in which
macroeconomic questions were addressed using this methodology. The
undergraduate course I taught was Quantitative Analysis of the Macroeconomy.
I chose to teach this course because I felt there was a need to develop material
that could be used in teaching what macroeconomics has become at the
undergraduate level. I felt there was this need because Finn’s and my work on
the time consistency problem and developments in agency theory led me to
the conclusion that having good macroeconomic policy requires having an
educated citizenry that can evaluate macroeconomic policy. A second reason
why I thought there was this need is that by introducing talented undergrad-
uates to the excitement of modern macroeconomics, some would be inﬂu-
enced to pursue careers in economic research and would make important 
advances to economic science.
In the course I introduced the real business cycle model economy, which is
the single sector growth model in which people decide how much of their 
income to consume and save and how much of their time endowment to 
allocate to the market. Motivated by Ragnar Frisch’s Nobel address (1970), 
I call this model the neoclassical growth model because it incorporates the 
willingness of people to substitute as well as their ability to substitute.
One decision that people must make is how to allocate their time endowment,
which is the most precious resource an individual has. Indeed, as my under-
graduates ﬁgure out, the present value of their time endowment is approxi-
mately 5 million current U.S. dollars, which makes them all multimillionaires.
Another crucial feature of any real business cycle model is that the model people
decide how much to consume and how much to invest or equivalently save.
371
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 371The course requires students to carry out quantitative analyses to address
speciﬁc questions. They use the methodology that Finn and I developed for
the study of business cycles to address policy issues. A typical exercise is to 
determine whether a proposal made by a public opinion leader or government
ofﬁcial will have the intended consequence. One question they were assigned
concerns ﬁnancing of transfer payments. Their ﬁnding was totally counter to
then-conventional wisdom. I will return to this ﬁnding later because it is an
implication of Finn Kydland’s and my business cycle theory.
2. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY
In this section I ﬁrst describe what macroeconomic models were before the
transformation and what they are after the transformation. Then I describe 
policy selection before and after the transformation. Before the transformation,
what is evaluated is a policy action given the current situation. Policy discussions
were in terms of questions such as whether the money supply should be increas-
ed or reduced. In his critique (1976), Robert Lucas established that questions
such as these are not well posed in the language of dynamic economic theory.
After the transformation, what is evaluated is a policy rule. A policy rule
speciﬁes the current policy action as a function of the current economic situa-
tion. As Finn and I found, no best policy rule exists. Typically, the policy rule
is best given that it will be followed in the future. Any such rule is by deﬁnition
time-consistent, but except in empirically uninteresting cases, Finn and I
show that time-consistent rules are not optimal; indeed, they lead to bad 
outcomes. All that can be hoped for is to follow a good rule, and this requires
economic and political institutions that sustain this rule.
Macroeconomic Models before the Transformation
Macroeconomic models were systems of equations that determined current
outcomes given the values of the current policy actions, values of predetermined
variables, and values of any stochastic shocks. Thus, physical models and 
pre-transformation macro models have the same mathematical structure.
The basic mathematical structure of both is
xt+1= f (xt,ut, t).
The state or position of the dynamic system at the beginning of period t is xt,
the control or policy variables are ut, and the stochastic shocks are  t.
With the system-of-equations approach, each equation in the system is 
determined up to a set of parameters. The simple prototype system-of-equations
macro model has a consumption function, an investment equation, a money
demand function, and a Phillips curve. Behind all these equations were a rich
empirical literature and, in the case of the consumption function, money 
demand function, and investment equation, some serious theoretical work.
The ﬁnal step was to use the tools of statistical estimation theory to select the
parameters that deﬁne the function f.
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selection problem as a Bayesian sequential decision problem. The problem is
a difﬁcult one because the policy actions taken today affect the distribution of
the posterior distribution of the values of the coefﬁcients of the equations.
The macroeconometric models organized the ﬁeld. Success in macroeco-
nomics was to have your equation incorporated into the macroeconometric
models. Indeed, Lucas and I were searching for a better investment equation
when in 1969 we wrote our paper “Investment under Uncertainty,” a paper that
was published two years later in 1971.
A key assumption in the system-of-equations approach is that the equations
are policy invariant. As Lucas points out in his critique, which I delivered in 1973,
this assumption is inconsistent with dynamic economic theory. His insight made
it clear that there was no hope for the neoclassical synthesis – that is, the devel-
opment of neoclassical underpinnings of the system-of-equations macro models.
Fortunately, with advances in dynamic economic theory an alternative set
of tractable macro models was developed for drawing scientiﬁc inference.
The key development was recursive competitive equilibrium theory in Lucas
and Prescott (1971) and Lucas (1972). Equilibrium being represented as a
set of stochastic processes with stationary transition probabilities was crucial
to the revolution in macroeconomics.
Macroeconomic Models after the Transformation
Models after the transformation are dynamic, fully articulated model economies
in the general equilibrium sense of the word economy. Model people maximize
utility given the price system, policy, and their consumption possibility set;
ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given their technology set, the price system, and policy;
and markets clear. Preferences, on the one hand, describe what people choose
from a given choice set. Technology, on the other hand, speciﬁes what outputs
can be produced given the inputs. Preferences and technology are policy invariant.
They are the data of the theory and not the equations as in the system-of-
equations approach. With the general equilibrium approach, empirical
knowledge is organized around preferences and technology, in sharp contrast
to the system-of-equations approach, which organizes knowledge about 
equations that specify the behavior of aggregations of households and ﬁrms.
The Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy
Before the transformation, optimal policy selection was a matter of solving
what the physical scientists called a control problem. This is not surprising, given
that the system-of-equations approach was borrowed from the physical sciences.
With such systems, the principle of optimality holds – that is, it is best to choose
at each point in time policy action that is best given the current situation and
the rules by which policy will be selected in the future. The optimal policy is
time-consistent, and dynamic programming techniques can be used to ﬁnd
the optimal policy as in the physical sciences. This is true even if there is 
uncertainty in the model economy.
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rium models, only policy rules could be evaluated. This led us to search for a
best rule to follow, where a rule speciﬁes policy actions as a function of the
state or position of the economy. We had worked on this problem before
Finn left Carnegie Mellon to join the faculty of the Norwegian School of
Business and Economics in 1973. In academic year 1974–1975 I visited the
Norwegian School of Business and Economics, and in the spring of 1975 Finn
and I returned to this problem. This is when we wrote our paper “Rules
Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” one of the two
papers for which Finn and I were awarded the Nobel Prize.
In previous research we had considered time-consistent stationary policy
rules. These rules have the property that they are a ﬁxed point of the mapping
that speciﬁes the best rule today as a function of the rule that will be used in
the future. The fact that these rules were not optimal led us to our key 
insight: the best event-contingent policy plan is not time-consistent. By this I
mean the continuation of a plan is not optimal at some future point in the
event-time tree. For example, it is always best to tax the returns on existing 
capital but not tax the returns on new investments. The reason is that a tax on
existing capital is a lump-sum tax and there is no associated distortion, whereas
any taxes on future returns of current investments are distortionary. But 
capital investments today become existing capital tomorrow, and tomorrow
the best policy action is to tax their returns.
This leads to the conclusion that being able to commit has value and that
having discretion has costs. The only method of commitment is to follow rules.
That is why we concluded that the time inconsistency of optimal plans necessi-
tates following rules. Some societies have had considerable success in following
good, but time-inconsistent, policy rules, and as a result their citizens enjoy a
higher standard of living. Other societies have limited success in this regard,
and as a result their citizens suffer economic hardships.
This need for rules in organizational settings has long been recognized.
That is why all agree that rule by a good set of laws is desirable. Rule by law is
a political institution to get around the time consistency problem. What was
new in our research was that this principle holds for macroeconomic policy
counter to what everyone thought at the time.
A Success in Following a Good Monetary Policy Rule
A notable example of a success in following a good, but time-inconsistent, rule
is the one maintaining a low and stable inﬂation rate. Before describing an
institution that is proving effective in getting commitment to this good rule in
many countries, I will ﬁrst describe one reason why the price stability policy
rule is time-inconsistent.
Consider an economy in which the nominal wage rate is set above the market
clearing level in some sectors, given the inﬂation rate speciﬁed by the rule. This
outcome could be the result of industry insiders in each of a number of 
industries ﬁnding this action in their best interest, given the wages chosen by the
insiders in other industries and the expected inﬂation rate. If the price stability
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This distortion can be reduced by having inﬂation in excess of the amount spec-
iﬁed by the rule. With the time-consistent monetary policy rule, inﬂation will be
at that level where the marginal value of higher inﬂation in reducing the distor-
tion will just equal the marginal cost of the higher inﬂation. The equilibrium
outcome is high inﬂation and no reduction in the distortion. Commitment to
the best rule will not result in high inﬂation, just the labor market distortion.
I turn now to an institution that is proving successful in sustaining this rule:
an independent central bank. Members of this organization have a vested
interest in following this rule, for if it is not followed, they would incur the
risk that they would suffer in the future. If inﬂation has been excessive and a
new administration is elected, people in the organization will be replaced
and the size of the central bank cut. Thus, members of this organization have a
vested interest in the rule being followed.
The increased stability of the economy and the improved performance of
the payment and credit system may be due in part to the diffusion of ﬁndings
of Finn’s and my “Rules Rather than Discretion” paper. People now recognize
much better the importance of having good macroeconomic institutions
such as an independent central bank.
To ﬁnd the time-consistent policy we de facto considered a game. In the 
simplest case, the value function of an individual is v(k,K) and that of the policy
maker v(K,K), where k is a given individual’s capital stock and K is the capital
stock of all others. Note that within the class of policies that treat individuals
anonymously, all individuals order policies in the same way as does the policy
maker. At the ﬁrst stage of each period, the policy maker selects the policy
that is best for the representative individual and the rule by which policy will
be selected in the future.
3. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MACROECONOMIC RESEARCH
The title of this address is “The Transformation of Macroeconomic Policy
and Research.” I turn now to the research part of the title. The methods used
in macroeconomic research were different prior to Finn’s and my paper,
“Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations” (1982). The new methodology
was developed in the summer of 1980 when Finn and I did the research and
wrote the ﬁrst draft of our “Time to Build” paper. We also wrote the ﬁrst draft
of this paper that summer.
Before specifying the new research methodology, I have to discuss what the
key business cycle facts are and why they led economists to falsely conclude
that business cycle ﬂuctuations were not in large part equilibrium responses
to real shocks. Then I will specify the methodology that Finn and I developed
and used to quantitatively determine the consequences of these shocks for
business cycle ﬂuctuations.
I emphasize that what is important is the methodology and that this 
methodology can be and has been used to quantitatively determine the 
consequences of both nominal and real shocks. By using these methods, the
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speculate. Instead they make quantitative statements as to the consequences
of various shocks and features of reality for business cycle ﬂuctuations. This
paper began a constructive and fruitful research program.
3.1 Business cycle facts
In the 1970s after the development of dynamic economic theory, it was clear
that something other than the system-of-equations approach was needed if
macroeconomics was to be integrated with the rest of economics. I want to
emphasize that macroeconomics then meant business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Growth theory, even though it dealt with the same set of aggregate economic
variables, was part of what was then called microeconomics, as was the study
of tax policies in public ﬁnance.
Business cycles are ﬂuctuations in output and employment about trend.
But what is trend? Having been trained as a statistician, I naturally looked to
theory to provide the deﬁnition of trend, with the plan to then use the tools
of statistics to estimate or measure it. But theory provided no deﬁnition of
trend, so in 1978 Bob Hodrick and I took the then-radical step of using an
operational deﬁnition of trend.1 With an operational deﬁnition, the concept
is deﬁned by the procedure used to determine the value of the concept.
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Figure 1. Deviations from Trend of U.S. GDP and Hours.
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2 See Stigler’s (1978) history of statistics.
Our trend is just a well-deﬁned statistic, where a statistic is a real valued
function. Hodrick and Prescott’s (1980) trend statistic mimics well the
smooth curve that economists ﬁt through the data. The family of trends we
considered is one-dimensional. The one in the family that we used is the ﬁrst
one we considered. Later we learned that the actuaries use this family of
smoothers, as did John von Neumann when he worked on ballistic problems
for the U.S. government during World War II.2 A desirable feature of this 
deﬁnition is that with the selection of smoothing parameters for quarterly 
time series, there are no degrees of freedom and the business cycle statistics
are not a matter of judgment. Having everyone looking at the same set of 
statistics facilitated the development of business cycle theory by making 
studies comparable.
One set of key business cycle facts are that two-thirds of business cycle 
ﬂuctuations are accounted for by variations in the labor input, one-third by
variations in total factor productivity, and virtually zero by variations in the 
capital service input. The importance of variation in the labor input can be
seen in Figure 1.
This is in sharp contrast to the secular behavior of the labor input and output,
which is shown in Figure 2. Secularly, per capita output has a strong upward
trend, while the per capita labor input shows no trend.
A second business cycle fact is that consumption moves procyclically; that
is, the cyclical component of consumption moves up and down with the 
cyclical component of output. A third fact is that in percentage terms, invest-
Figure 2. Indices of Per Capita Real GDP and Hours.
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ment variation is a disproportionate part of cyclical output variation. This is
shown in Figure 3.
3.2 Inference drawn from these facts
Now why did economists looking at these facts conclude that they ruled out
total factor productivity and other real shocks as being a signiﬁcant contributor
to business cycle ﬂuctuations? Their reasoning is as follows. Leisure and 
consumption are normal goods. The evidence at that time was that the real
wage was acyclical, which implies no cyclical substitution effects and leaves
only the wealth effect. Therefore, in the boom when income is high, the
quantity of leisure should be high, when in fact it is low. This logic is based on
partial equilibrium reasoning, and the conclusion turned out to be wrong.
In the 1970s a number of interesting conjectures arose as to why the 
economy ﬂuctuated as it does. Most were related to ﬁnding a propagation 
mechanism that resulted in Lucas’s monetary surprise shocks having 
persistent real effects. With this theory, leisure moves countercyclically in con-
formity with observations. The deviations of output and employment from
trend are not persistent with this theory, but in fact they are persistent. This
initiated a search for some feature of reality that when introduced gives rise
to persistent real effects. To put it another way, economists searched for what
Frisch called a propagation mechanism for the effects of monetary surprises.
Taylor (1980) and Fischer (1977) provided empirical and theoretical evidence
in support of their conjecture that staggered nominal wage contracting might
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be the mechanism by which monetary shocks gave rise to persistent real 
effects on output and employment. Another conjectured mechanism of that
era is the cost of changing nominal prices. In that era about the only people
who argued that real shocks were the factor were Long and Plosser (1983). 
I say “in that era” because earlier, Wicksell (1907), Pigou (1927), and others
held the view that real shocks were an important contribution to business 
cycles. My prior at the time we did the research for our “Time to Build” paper,
and I think Finn’s prior as well, was that business cycle ﬂuctuations were 
induced by nominal and not real shocks.
3.3 Macroeconomics and growth theory before the “Time to Build” paper
Macroeconomics of the 1970s largely ignored capital accumulation. Growth
theory was concerned with the long-term movements in the economic aggre-
gates, whereas macroeconomics was concerned with the short-term move-
ments. Virtually no connection was made between the then-dormant growth
theory and the dynamic equilibrium theories of business cycles. Probably the
reason was that short-term movements in output are accounted for in large
part by movements in the labor input, whereas long-term growth in living
standards is accounted for by increases in the capital service input and in total
factor productivity. All these variables are per working-age person.
Kydland and I decided to use the neoclassical growth model to study business
cycle ﬂuctuations in the summer of 1980. The basic theoretical framework we
developed came to be called the real business cycle model. The term real does
not mean that the framework can be used only to answer questions concerning
the consequences of real shocks. The real business cycle model is equally 
applicable to addressing the consequences of monetary shocks. I will not be
discussing these monetary applications in this address because Kydland will
in his address. This is appropriate given that he and his collaborators, and
not I, are leaders in the study of the consequences of monetary policy for 
business cycles.
3.4 The methodology
This model builds on the contributions of many economists, many of whom
have been awarded the Nobel Prize. The importance of the contributions of
Simon Kuznets and Richard Stone in developing the national income and
product accounts cannot be overstated. These accounts reveal a set of growth
facts, which led to Solow’s (1956) classical growth model, which Solow (1970)
calibrated to the growth facts. This simple but elegant model accounts well
for the secular behavior of the principal economic aggregates. With this mod-
el, however, labor supply is supplied inelastically and savings is behaviorally
determined. There are people in the classical growth model economy, but
they make no decisions. This is why I, motivated by Frisch’s Nobel address de-
livered here in 1969, refer to this model as the classical growth model.
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Step 1: Start with the Neoclassical Growth Model
Central to the neoclassical growth model is the Solow–Swan aggregate 
production function. As explained in Solow (1956, n. 7), the theory underlying
the aggregate production function is a theory of the income side of the 
national accounts.3 With competitive factor and product markets and entry
and exit of production units, factor claims against product exhaust product.
In addition, output is maximized given the quantities of the factor inputs
supplied.
The function Ft is the period t aggregate production function that speciﬁes
the output that is produced as a function of the inputs
(1) ct + xt = yt = Ft(kt,lt),
where c is consumption, x is investment, y is output, k is the capital service input,
and l is the labor service input. One unit of capital provides one unit of capital
services, and capital depreciates geometrically at rate  . Thus,
(2) kt+1 = (1–  )kt + xt.
We also introduced a multi-period requirement for building new capacity be-
cause we thought it might be an important shock propagation mechanism.4
For the growth model to be neoclassical, the savings-investment and labor-
leisure decisions must be decisions of the households. Finn and I introduced
an aggregate or stand-in household with preferences ordered by the expected
discounted value of utility ﬂows from consumption and leisure; that is, the
household maximizes the expected value of
(3) u(ct,1–ht),
where c is consumption and 1– h is leisure. The aggregation theory underlying
this aggregate household is based in part on the ﬁrst welfare theory, namely,
that a competitive equilibrium maximized some weighted average of individual
utilities.
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Previously, others had effectively endogenized the savings decision by ana-
lyzing the optimal growth path because, by the second welfare theorem, the
optimal path is the competitive equilibrium path for this model.5 But in order
for the model to be used to study business cycle ﬂuctuations, the labor supply
decision must be endogenized as well.6
Step 2: Modify the National Accounts to Be Consistent with the Theory
Prior to our work, macroeconomics was concerned with developing a theory
of the national accounts statistics. Preferences and technology are the given,
not the national accounts statistics. This means that we had to modify the 
national accounts to be consistent with the theoretical abstraction or model
we used. The most important modiﬁcation when studying business cycles is to
treat consumer durable expenditures as an investment in the same way that
expenditures on new housing and home improvement are treated as invest-
ments in the national accounts. Once this is done, services of consumer 
durables and consumer durable rental income must be imputed, in much the 
same way as is currently done for owner-occupied housing. This increases 
investment share of output and has consequences for the cyclical behavior of the
economy. What led us to think about this issue is that consumer durable expen-
ditures are highly variable, behaving very similarly to producer durable invest-
ments and not like consumer expenditures on nondurable goods and services.
Step 3: Restrict the Model to Be Consistent with the Growth Facts
The growth facts are that consumption and investment shares of output are
roughly constant, as are labor and capital cost shares. All the variables and
the real wage grow over time except for labor supply and the return on capi-
tal, which are roughly constant. This leads to a Cobb–Douglas production
function. These facts also imply the constancy of the capital-output ratio and
of the rental price of capital.
Two key growth facts are that the real wage and consumption grow at the
same secular rate as does real output per capita, while labor supply displays
no secular trend. This restricts the period utility function to be of the form
(4) u(c,1–h) =                                 .
5 Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) in deterministic situations establish the existence of an 
optimal path and characterize properties of this optimal path. Diamond (1965) studies the com-
petitive equilibrium path in an economy with capital accumulation. In his economy, people live two
periods. Brock and Mirman (1972) deal with the problem of optimal growth when there are 
stochastic shocks to the technology. These studies are in the nonquantitative theory tradition.
Danthine and Donaldson (1981) compute the equilibrium process for the Brock and Mirman
(1972) stochastic growth model.
6 Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) carry out a deterministic dynamic applied general 
equilibrium analysis with endogenous labor supply in which they evaluate tax policies.
(c g(1 – l))1–   –1
1 –  
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made this choice based on a variety of evidence. The principal evidence used
is comparisons of the return on capital for fast- and slow-growing economies.
Fortunately, it turned out that our ﬁndings are not sensitive to this parameter,
because at the time of our work, this key economic parameter had not been
tightly tied down.
With   = 1, the above utility function is
(5) log c + g(1–l).
The nature of the g function matters. The growth facts do not tie down the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and this parameter
turned out to be key for deriving the predictions of the growth model for 
business cycle ﬂuctuations. Subsequently, this key parameter has been tied
down.
Step 4: Introduce a Markovian Shock Process
We wanted something in our model economy that led to labor supply errors
and something to propagate these errors. Here, by “labor supply errors” I mean
the difference between the optimal labor supply decision given individuals’
information set and the decision that they would make if they observed the
state of the economy without observation error. We introduced a total factor
productivity shock that is independent over time and assumes that agents see
the value of total factor productivity (TFP) with noise prior to making their
labor supply decisions. We also introduced a second highly persistent autore-
gressive TFP shock. We introduced this shock because it is simple to do and
we were curious to see what its consequences are. In order to use the Kalman
ﬁlter, the two shocks and measurement errors are all normally distributed.
Step 5: Make a Linear Quadratic Approximation
The next step is to determine the steady state of the economy when the 
variances of the TFP shocks are zero. Then a linear quadratic economy is
constructed, which has the same ﬁrst two derivatives at the steady state. This 
linear quadratic economy displays the growth facts, and its equilibrium is easily
computed. The behavior of this economy will be arbitrarily close to the 
economy we began with for sufﬁciently small variances of the two TFP shocks
and the measurement errors. It turned out that it was extremely close even
for variances far bigger than the ones we introduced.7
Step 6: Compute the Competitive Equilibrium Process
The next step is to compute the recursive competitive equilibrium stochastic
process.
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Step 7: Simulate the Model Economy
The equilibrium stochastic process is used to generate a time series realiza-
tion of the model economy. If the number of observations in the period
being considered is N, a time series of length signiﬁcantly greater than N is
generated and the last N observations considered. A longer time series is 
generated because we wanted a draw from the invariant distribution for the
state of the economy as a starting point of the model’s sample path.
Step 8: Examine the Key Business Cycle Statistics and Draw Scientiﬁc Inference
The last step is to compare the key business cycle statistics for the model and
the actual economy. I emphasize that the identical statistics for the model
and the actual economy are compared.
One important statistic is the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of output. What we deﬁned to be the cyclical component of output is ﬁrst
computed for the actual economy and the standard deviation determined.
The identical procedure is followed for realizations of the equilibrium process
of the model economy. This means the model is simulated to generate the 
time series of output and other series. Next the cyclical component of output
is computed and its standard deviation determined. This is done many times
so that the ﬁrst two moments of the sampling distribution of the standard 
deviation of the model’s cyclical output statistic can be determined.
If the sampling distribution of this statistic in question is concentrated
about some number, this number relative to the statistic speciﬁes how variable
the economy would have been if TFP shocks were the only shocks. If the 
sampling distribution of this statistic is not concentrated, theory does not 
provide a precise accounting. But the sampling distribution is highly concen-
trated provided the number of quarterly observations is at least 100.
I emphasize that this is not a test in the sense of Neyman–Pearson statistical
hypothesis tests, which are useful in the search for a model or law through 
induction. The way theory is tested is through successful use. The neoclassical
growth model is tested theory.
4. USING THE METHODOLOGY IN BUSINESS CYCLE RESEARCH
Kydland and Prescott (1982) found, as reported in our paper “Time to Build
and Aggregate Fluctuations,” that if elasticity of substitution of labor supply is
3 and TFP shocks are highly persistent and of the right magnitude, then 
business cycles are what the neoclassical growth model predicts. This includes
the amplitude of ﬂuctuation of output, the serial correlation properties of 
cyclical output, the relative variability of consumption and investment, the
fact that capital stock peaks and bottoms out later than does output, the 
cyclical behavior of leisure, and the cyclical output accounting facts.
Subsequently, Prescott (1986) found that the shocks were highly persistent
and the TFP shocks of the right magnitude. Conditional on a labor supply
elasticity close to 3, TFP shocks are the major contributor to ﬂuctuations in
the period 1954–1981 in the United States.
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Huffman (1988) ﬁnd that if, on average, TFP shocks are non-neutral with 
regard to consumption and investment, the conclusions hold. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1995) introduce imperfect competition and show that the
ﬁnding is overthrown only if monopoly rents are far in excess of what they
could be. With imperfect competition restricted to be consistent with labor
cost share, Hornstein (1993) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) show
that the importance of TFP shocks for business cycle ﬂuctuations hardly
changes. With the introduction of monopolistic competition, model-TFP
shock variance is picked so that the model Solow-TFP variance matches the
actual economy’s Solow-TFP variance. In these monopolistic competitive
worlds, Solow-TFP is a complex statistic and is not total factor productivity.
Investment in the model economy varies smoothly, as does aggregate 
investment in the actual economy. Investment at the plant level, however, is
not smooth, and a natural question is whether this has consequences for 
modeling business cycles. Fisher and Hornstein (2000) ﬁnd that having
plants that make lumpy inventory investment in equilibrium does not change
the estimates of the contribution of TFP shocks to ﬂuctuations. For invest-
ment in plant and equipment, Thomas (2002) develops an economy that 
displays lumpy investment at the plant level. When calibrated to the growth
facts and establishment investment statistics, the ﬁndings for business cycles
using her abstraction are virtually the same as those using the neoclassical
growth model.
Ríos-Rull (1995) uses a carefully calibrated overlapping generations model
and ﬁnds that the estimated importance of TFP shocks for business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations does not change. Within this framework, Ríos-Rull (1994) then shuts
down ﬁnancial markets, so physical capital holdings is the only way to save.
This extreme version of market incompleteness does not affect the estimate
of the importance of TFP shocks. Introducing uninsurable idiosyncratic risk
(see Krusell and Smith, 1998) does not affect the estimate either. Hansen and
Prescott (2005) deal with capacity utilization constraints that are occasionally
binding. With their introduction, the nature of the predictions for business
cycles changes a little, but in a way that results in observations being in even
closer conformity with theory.
Using this methodology, Danthine and Donaldson (1981) and Gomme
and Greenwood (1995) investigate the consequences of various non-Walrasian
features for business cycle ﬂuctuations. There are interesting implications for
relative variability of consumption for those with large capital ownership and
those with no capital ownership.
Freeman and Kydland (2000) and Cooley and Hansen (1995) ﬁnd that 
introducing money and a transaction technology does not alter the conclusion
as to the importance of TFP shocks. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000)
ﬁnd that nominal contracting does not either. They introduce staggered 
nominal contracting into the basic business cycle model and ﬁnd that in such
worlds, monetary shocks have effects that are persistent but too small to be an
important contributor to business cycle ﬂuctuations. In summary, introducing
384
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monetary factors did not alter Finn’s and my ﬁnding that TFP shocks are the
major contributor to business cycle ﬂuctuations in the United States in the
1954–1980 period we consider in our “Time to Build” paper.
But in all cases, to generate business cycles of the magnitude and nature
observed, the aggregate labor supply elasticity must be 3.8 This attests to the
robustness of the ﬁnding and focuses attention on this elasticity parameter. A
variety of evidence that supports the number 3 had to be found before it was
safe to conclude that the neoclassical growth model predicts business cycle
ﬂuctuations of the quantitative nature observed.
5. EVIDENCE THAT THE AGGREGATE ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY IS 3
A problem with the abstraction that many economists used to incorrectly
conclude that labor supply is inelastic is that it has the prediction that every-
one should make essentially the same percentage adjustment in hours worked.
This is not the case. Over the business cycle, most of the variation in the 
aggregate number of hours worked is in the fraction of people working and
not in the hours worked per worker. Looking at this observation, Rogerson
(1984, 1988) studies a static world in which people either work a standard
workweek or do not work. He shows that in this world, the aggregate elasticity
of labor supply is inﬁnite up to the point that the fraction employed is one.
Rogerson’s aggregation result is every bit as important as the one giving rise
to the aggregate production function.9 In the case of production technology,
the nature of the aggregate production function in the empirically inter-
esting cases is very different from that of the individual production units
being aggregated. The same is true for the aggregate or a stand-in household’s
utility function in the empirically interesting case.
Aggregate hours of labor supplied to the market per working-age person,
l, equals the product of the fraction employed, e, and hours per employee, h;
that is
(6) l = eh.
If the principal margin of adjustment in l is the employment rate and not
hours per employee, then aggregate labor supply elasticity will be much bigger
than the elasticity of labor supply of the individuals being aggregated. Given
that the principal margin of adjustment is e and not h, the aggregate labor supply
elasticity is much greater than the individual labor supply elasticity.
8 For reviews of many more business cycles studies, see Frontiers of Business Cycle Research 
(Cooley 1995).
9 Rogerson uses the Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) lottery commodity point. This simpli-
ﬁes the analysis, but does not change the results because lottery equilibria are equivalent to Arrow–
Debreu equilibria; see Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (2002) and Prescott and Shell (2002).
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 385Multiple margins determine e. Particularly important for males and single
females is the fraction of potential working life that he or she works. This
fraction is smaller if an individual retires earlier. For married females,
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) ﬁnd that as the Rogerson theory predicts,
their labor supply is highly elastic, with some estimates being as high as 10.
For all, weeks of vacation and the number of holidays is another important
margin of adjustment in labor supply.
Hansen (1985) derives the consequence of the Rogerson (1988) assump-
tion for business cycle ﬂuctuations and develops a stand-in household for a type.
He ﬁnds that in worlds with labor indivisibility, ﬂuctuations induced by TFP
shocks alone give rise to ﬂuctuations 10 percent greater than those observed.
This indicates that aggregate labor supply elasticity is not inﬁnite as in his 
model world.
Hansen’s ﬁndings led Finn and me to introduce both margins of labor
supply adjustment. We numerically found the only margin used is e with the
standard production function. The natural question is why? Hornstein and
Prescott (1993) answer this question.10 We permitted both margins to be ad-
justed. The key modiﬁcation is that a worker’s output y is
(7) y = Ah k  ,
where h is the workweek length of this individual and k is the capital stock
that this individual uses. A consequence is that payment per hour is an increa-
sing function of h.
A key result is that all the growth facts hold for this modiﬁcation of the
neoclassical growth model. The important feature of this model is that capital
used by one individual is not used by another in the period.
For the calibrated economy, the ﬁnding is that only the e margin is used 
except in extreme cases when all are employed. Only with e = 1 is h>h, where
h is the endogenously determined “standard” week length. A question, then,
is why do we see any variation in h? My answer is that in worlds with “islands,”
some islands have e = 1 and h h at a point in time. Here island i indicates
occupation as well as location of work activity.
A question is: What is the real wage? The price of each workweek length is
wit (h), where i denotes the island. If one naively assumes that an individual
on island i is being paid real wage wit(hit)/hit  and regresses the logarithm of
hit on the log of this assumed wage, a small regression coefﬁcient would be
386
10 Many years prior, Sherwin Rosen (1978) had pointed out that workweeks of different lengths are
different commodities and their price is not, in general, proportional to the length of the work-
week. Introducing this feature of reality into an applied dynamic general equilibrium model of 
business cycles did not occur until Kydland and Prescott (1991). Earlier, Hansen and Sargent
(1988) had two workweek lengths, straight time and overtime.
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11 See Prescott (2004).
12 The preference ordering used has a constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure, not between consumption and labor supplied to the market. The elasticity of labor supply
for our stand-in household is (1 – h)/h, where h is the fraction of productive time allocated to the
market. Given that h in Europe is smaller than one-fourth of the U.S. number, the elasticity of 
labor supply there is even greater than 3 in Europe.
obtained in this island version of the Hornstein–Prescott world. Many ran this
regression for full-time male workers and obtained a small coefﬁcient as 
predicted by theory, independent of whether the micro or Frischian labor
supply elasticity is big or small.
Thus, a low value of this regression coefﬁcient does not imply low elasticity
of aggregate labor supply elasticity, which is what matters for the study of 
business cycles and the evaluation of tax policies. A low value does not even
indicate a low micro labor supply elasticity, which is a statement about prefer-
ences only. I emphasize that aggregate labor supply elasticity is a statement about
both preferences and technology. Only for empirically uninteresting cases are the
micro and macro elasticities equal.
Evidence from Consequence of Tax Rates across Countries and across Time
Good statistics are available on labor supply and tax rates across the major ad-
vanced industrial countries. My measure of aggregate labor supply is aggregate
hours worked in the market sector divided by the number of working-age 
people.
Given that the effect of the marginal effective tax rate on labor supply 
depends on this elasticity, and given that tax rates vary considerably, these 
observations provide an almost ideal test of whether the aggregate labor
supply elasticity is 3. The set of countries that Prescott (2004) studied are the
G-7 countries, which are the large advanced industrial countries. The differ-
ences in marginal tax rates and labor supply are large; Canada, Japan, and
the United States have rates near 0.40, and France, Germany, and Italy near
0.60.11 The prediction, based on an aggregate labor supply elasticity of 3, that
Western Europeans will work one-third less than North Americans and
Japanese is conﬁrmed.12 Added evidence for an aggregate elasticity of 3 is
that it explains why labor supply in France and Germany was nearly 50 
percent greater during the 1970–1974 period than it is today.
Observations on aggregate labor supply across countries and across time
imply a labor supply elasticity near 3.
Recent Evidence from Major Contractions and Expansions
Additional evidence is provided by the study of recent major contractions.
The ﬁnding is that the elasticity of labor supply must be near 3 to account for
the behavior of the labor supply in each case. Three advanced industrial
countries with good economic statistics suffered a 20 percent or more loss in
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century. The countries are Japan in the 1990s and New Zealand and
Switzerland in the 1970s and 1980s. The behavior of labor supply during these
extended periods of nonbalanced growth implies the same labor supply
elasticity as do business cycle ﬂuctuations.13
Life Cycle Labor Supply Evidence
Recently, Imai and Keene (2004) examined the life cycle pattern of male labor
supply. Real payments per hour are hump-shaped, as are hours worked over
the working lifetime. The percentage size of the hump is greater for real 
payment per hour than for hours worked. This led some to conclude that male
labor supply is inelastic; that is, the elasticity is less than 1. Imai and Keene take
into consideration the value of the skills that younger workers acquire on the
job – that is, the human capital they receive. This is part of total compensa-
tion and should be included in the wage. When it is, the lifetime wage schedule
is much ﬂatter than life cycle labor supply. Imai and Keene’s estimate is 3.7. If
this estimate rather than 3 is used, it would not change business cycle ﬁndings
signiﬁcantly. Further, the real interest rate implied by their analysis is close to
the average real return on capital obtained using the neoclassical growth model
and the national accounts.
An important difference between what labor economists estimate and what
macroeconomists estimate is that labor economists use a constant elasticity 
of substitution utility function on consumption and labor supply, whereas 
macroeconomists use a constant elasticity of substitution on consumption
and leisure.
A problem with many labor economists’ estimates is that they maintain the
hypothesis that people are not in organizational settings that have a ﬁxed
workweek length. Fitzgerald (1998) introduces team production with both
supervisors and workers. Equilibrium is characterized by a ﬁxed workweek
length. The hours worked is not a choice variable of individuals. The individual
choice variable is whether or not to work for this organization or for some other
organization. In this world when people are promoted from worker to super-
visor, their wages increase, but no change in hours worked occurs. Under the
incorrect maintained hypothesis, these observations would lead to the concl-
usion that labor supply is perfectly inelastic, even if it is in fact large.
To summarize, aggregate observations imply that the aggregate labor supply
elasticity is large. Aggregation theory implies that whenever the principal
margin of adjustment is the fraction employed and not hours per person 
employed, the aggregate labor supply elasticity is large. This ﬁnding is 
consistent with all the micro observations, so no conﬂict arises between micro
and macro observations.
388
13 See the Kehoe and Prescott (2002) volume for a number of economic depression studies.
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6. SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSINESS CYCLE RESEARCH
We learned that business cycle ﬂuctuations are the optimal response to real
shocks. The cost of a bad shock cannot be avoided, and policies that attempt
to do so will be counterproductive, particularly if they reduce production 
efﬁciency. During the 1981 and current oil crises, I was pleased that policies
were not instituted that adversely affected the economy by reducing produc-
tion efﬁciency. This is in sharp contrast to the oil crisis in 1974 when, rather
than letting the economy respond optimally to a bad shock so as to minimize
its cost, policies were instituted that adversely affected production efﬁciency
and depressed the economy much more than it would otherwise have been.
To summarize, concern has shifted away from business cycle ﬂuctuations
toward more important things. One important thing is setting up a good tax
system. Finn’s and my work sheds light on the most important economic
parameter in the design of a tax system, the aggregate labor supply elasticity.
In ﬁnding that technology shocks are important for ﬂuctuations, our research
program has been important in shifting the profession’s attention to how
economic institutions affect total factor productivity.
7. BEYOND BUSINESS CYCLE RESEARCH
The methodology that Finn and I developed and used to study business 
cycles is equally applicable to studying other phenomena. In this section I will
brieﬂy review three successful applications of this methodology and one very
interesting open puzzle. While presenting evidence that the labor supply
elasticity is 3, I already effectively reviewed one highly successful application 
– namely, my study assessing the role of taxes in accounting for the huge 
differences in labor supply across the advanced industrial countries and the
huge fall in labor supply in Europe between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s.
Using the Methodology in the Stock Market Valuation Research
An interesting question is, why did the value of the stock market relative to
GDP vary by a factor of 2.5 in the United States and 3 in the United Kingdom
in the last half of the 20th century? Other variables display little secular vari-
ation relative to GDP, whether they are corporate after-tax proﬁts or corporate
physical capital relative to GDP.
Clearly the single sector neoclassical growth model does not sufﬁce for 
studying the market value of corporate equity. The model must have both a
corporate and noncorporate sector. Fortunately, the national accounts report
the components of value added for the corporate sector as well as for govern-
ment business, household business, and unincorporated business sectors.
Various adjustments must be made to the accounts to bring them into con-
formity with the model, such as using producer prices for both inputs and
outputs to the business sector.
An equilibrium relation develops when the market value of corporations is
equal to the value of their productive assets. The capital accounts of the 
national accounts provide measures of the cost of replacing tangible capital.
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organization capital, brand names, and patents, which also affect the market
value of corporations. These assets cannot be ignored when determining
what theory says the value of the stock market should be. This presents a 
problem for determining the fundamental value of the stock market – a problem
that McGrattan and I solve (see McGrattan and Prescott, 2005a).
We ﬁnd that the secular behavior of the value of the U.S. stock market is as
theory predicts. What turns out to be important for the movement in the value
of corporations relative to GDP are changes in tax and regulatory policies. If
the tax rate on distributions by corporations is 50 percent rather than 0 percent,
the value of corporations will be only half as large given the resource cost of
their productive assets.
Our study uses a neoclassical growth model and connects the model to 
national income and product data, tax data, and sector balance sheet data.
We submitted the paper to the Review of Economic Studies, a British journal.
The editor rightfully insisted that we do the analysis for the U.K. stock market
as well as for the U.S. stock market. We were nervous as to what theory and
measurement would say and were happy when we found that the behavior of
the value of the U.K. stock market was also in conformity to theory. Here is an
example of the power of the macroeconomic methodology that Finn and I
developed.
The excessive volatility of stock prices remains. Indeed, our study strength-
ens this puzzle. Stocks of productive capital vary little from year to year, whe-
reas stock prices sometimes vary a lot. I am sure this volatility puzzle will, in
the not too distant future, be resolved by some imaginative neoclassical eco-
nomist. However, resolving the secular movement puzzle is progress.
This example illustrates how macroeconomics has changed as a result of
the methodology that Finn and I pioneered. It is now that branch of economics
in which applied dynamic equilibrium tools are used to study aggregate phe-
nomena. The study of each of these aggregate phenomena is uniﬁed under
one theory. This uniﬁcation attests to the maturity of economic science when
it comes to studying dynamic aggregate phenomena.
Using the Methodology to Study the Great U.S. Depression
The welfare gains from eliminating business cycles are small or negative. The
welfare gains from eliminating depression and creating growth miracles are
large. Cole and Ohanian (1999) broke a taboo and used the neoclassical
growth model to study the Great U.S. Depression. One of their particularly
interesting ﬁndings is that labor supply on a per adult basis in the 1935–1939
period was 25 percent below what it was before the Depression. Recently,
Cole and Ohanian (2004) showed how New Deal cartelization could very well
have been the reason for the low labor supply using neoclassical economics.
The rapid recovery of the U.S. economy subsequent to the abandonment of
these cartelization policies supports their theory.
390
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 390391
Japan’s Lost Decade of Growth
A more recent example is Japan’s lost decade of growth, which was the
1992–2001 decade. Hayashi and Prescott (2002), treating TFP as exogenous,
ﬁnd that the neoclassical growth model predicts well the path of the principal
aggregates. In particular it quantitatively predicts the large capital deepening
and the associated fall in the return on capital. It quantitatively predicts the
behavior of labor supply as well, which is further evidence for the high labor
elasticity of labor supply.
A Business Cycle Puzzle
An economic boom in the United States began with an expansion relative to
trend in early 1996 and continued to the fourth quarter of 1999. Then, a 
contraction set in and continued until the third quarter to 2001. At the peak,
detrended GDP per working-age person was 4 percent above trend and labor
supply 5 percent above average. None of the obvious candidates for the high
labor supply were operating. There was no war with temporarily high public
consumption that was debt ﬁnanced; tax rates were not low; TFP measured in
the standard way was not high; and there was no monetary surprise that
would give rise to high labor supply. This is why I say this boom is a puzzle for
the neoclassical growth model.
Why did people supply so much labor in this boom period? The work of
McGrattan and Prescott (2005a), which determines the quantitative predic-
tions of theory for the value of the stock markets, suggests an answer. The
problem is one of measurement. During this period (see McGrattan and
Prescott, 2005b), there is evidence that unmeasured investment was high, as
was unmeasured compensation. Therefore, output and productivity were higher
than the standard statistics indicate. The measurement problem is to come up
with estimates of this expensed investment. With these improved measure-
ments of economic activity, theory can be used to determine whether or not
the puzzle has been solved.
This example illustrates the uniﬁed nature of aggregate economics today.
The real business cycle model was extended and used to understand the 
behavior of the stock market, and that extended model in turn is now being
used to resolve a business cycle puzzle.
8. RAGNAR FRISCH’S VISION REALIZED
I conclude this address with an ode to Frisch, who was awarded the ﬁrst
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1969. Frisch’s Nobel address is entitled “From
Utopian Theory to Practical Applications: The Case of Econometrics” (1970).
He is the father of quantitative neoclassical economics, which is what he is re-
ferring to by the word econometrics in the title.14
14 Frisch (1970, p. 12) reports that the English mathematician and economist Jevons (1835–1882)
dreamed that we would be able to quantify neoclassical economics.
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Prior to Frisch’s creating the Econometric Society in 1930 and launching
Econometrica in 1933, neoclassical economists did little to verify their theoreti-
cal results by statistical observations. Frisch writes in his Nobel address that
the reason was in part the poor quality of statistics then available and in part
that neoclassical theory was not developed with systematic veriﬁcation in view.
The American Institutionalists and German Historical schools pointed this
out and advocated letting the facts speak for themselves. The impact of these
schools on economic thought was minimal. To quote Frisch, “Facts that speak
for themselves, talk in a very naive language” (1970, p. 16). Now theory derives its
concepts from measurement, and in turn theory dictates new measurement.
The latter is what McGrattan and I are currently doing to resolve the puzzle of
why U.S. employment was so high at the end of the 1990s.
In the 1960s Frisch was frustrated by the lack of progress in his quest to 
making neoclassical economics quantitative and referred to much of what
was being done then as “playometrics.” It is a little unfair to criticize those 
studying business cycles at that time for not using the full discipline of neo-
classical economics. All the needed tools were not yet part of the economist’s
tool kit. Some of these tools that are crucial to the study of business cycles are
Lindal’s extension of general equilibrium theory to dynamic environments;
Savage’s statistical decision theory as uncertainty is central to business cycles;
Arrow and Debreu’s extension of general equilibrium theory to environments
with uncertainty; Blackwell’s development of recursive methods which are
needed in computation and in representation of a dynamic stochastic equili-
brium; Lucas and Prescott’s development of recursive competitive equilibrium
theory;15 and, of course, the computer.
Particularly noteworthy is Lucas’s role in the macroeconomic revolution.
In the very late 1960s and early 1970s he revolutionized macroeconomics by
taking the position that neoclassical economics should be used to study busi-
ness cycles. Others had dreamed of doing it, but Lucas actually ﬁgured out
ways to do it. In his 1972 paper “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,”
he creates and analyzes a dynamic stochastic neoclassical model that displays
the Phillips curve, which is a key equation in the system-of-equations macro
models. I can think of no paper in economics as important as this one. The
key prediction based upon this theoretical analysis – namely, that there is no
exploitable trade-off between inﬂation and employment – was conﬁrmed in
the 1970s when attempts were made to exploit the then perceived trade-off.
But Lucas’s work is not quantitative dynamic general equilibrium, and only
10 years later did Finn and I ﬁgure out how to quantitatively derive the im-
plications of theory and measurement for business cycle ﬂuctuations using
the full discipline of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory and 
15 This was further developed in Prescott and Mehra (1980). The published version of “Investment
under Uncertainty” did not include the section formally deﬁning the recursive equilibrium with
policy and value functions depending on both an individual ﬁrm’s capacity and the industry 
capacity and was an industry equilibrium analysis.
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quantitative nature observed are what theory predicts is testimony to the
grand research program of Ragnar Frisch and to the vision and creative 
genius of Robert Lucas.
On nearly every dimension I am in agreement with what Frisch advocated
in his Nobel Prize address, but on one dimension I am not. Like Frisch, I am
a fervent believer in the democratic process. The dimension on which I disagree
is how economists and policy makers should interact. His view is that the 
democratic political process should determine the objective, and economists
should then determine the best policy given this objective. My view is that
economists should educate the people so that they can evaluate macroeco-
nomic policy rules and that the people, through their elective representativ-
es, should pick the policy rule. I emphasize that Finn and my “Rules Rather
than Discretion” paper ﬁnds that public debate should be over rules and that
rules should be changed only infrequently, with a lag to mitigate the time
consistency problem.
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan J., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Jonathan Skinner. 1983. “The Efﬁciency
Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform.” Int. Econ. Rev. 24 (February): 81–100.
Brock, William A., and Leonard J. Mirman. 1972. “Optimal Economic Growth and
Uncertainty: The Discounted Case.” J. Econ. Theory 4 (June): 479–513.
Cass, David. 1965. “Optimal Growth in an Aggregate Model of Capital Accumulation.” 
Rev. Econ. Studies 32 (April): 233–240.
Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan. 2000. “Sticky Price Models of the
Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?”
Econometrica 68 (September): 1151–1179.
Cole, Harold L., and Lee E. Ohanian. 1999. “The Great Depression in the United States
from a Neoclassical Perspective.” Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Q. Rev. 23 (Winter): 2–24.
Cole, Harold L., and Lee E. Ohanian. 2004. “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the
Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis.” J. Polit. Economy 112 (August):
779–816.
Cooley, Thomas F., ed. 1995. Frontiers of Business Cycle Research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press.
Cooley, Thomas F., and Gary D. Hansen. 1995. “Money and the Business Cycle.” In Frontiers
of Business Cycle Research, edited by Thomas F. Cooley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
Danthine, Jean-Pierre, and John B. Donaldson. 1981. “Stochastic Properties of Fast vs. Slow
Growing Economies.” Econometrica 49 (July): 1007–1033.
Devereux, Michael B., Allen C. Head, and Beverly J. Lapham. 1996. “Monopolistic
Competition, Increasing Returns, and the Effects of Government Spending.” J. Money,
Credit, Banking 28 (May): 233–254.
Diamond, Peter A. 1965. “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model.” Amer. Econ. Rev.
55 (December): 1126–1150.
Fischer, Stanley. 1977. “Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal
Money Supply Rule.” J. Polit. Economy 85 (February): 191–205.
Fisher, Jonas D. M., and Andreas Hornstein. 2000. “(S, s) Inventory Policies in General
Equilibrium.” Rev. Econ. Studies 67 (January): 117–145.
Fitzgerald, Terry J. 1998. “Work Schedules, Wages, and Employment in a General
Equilibrium Model with Team Production.” Rev. Econ. Dynam. 1 (October): 809–834.
Freeman, Scott, and Finn E. Kydland. 2000. “Monetary Aggregates and Output.” Amer. 
Econ. Rev. 90 (December): 1125–1135.
393
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 393Frisch, Ragnar. 1970. “From Utopian Theory to Practical Applications: The Case of
Econometrics.” Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, June 17, 1970. www.nobelprize.org.
Gomme, Paul, and Jeremy Greenwood. 1995. “On the Cyclical Allocation of Risk.” J. Econ.
Dynam. Control 19 (January–February): 92–124.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Gregory W. Huffman. 1988. “Investment, Capacity
Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle.” Amer. Econ. Rev. 78 (June): 402–417.
Hansen, Gary D. 1985. “Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle.” J. Monetary Econ. 16 
(November): 309–327.
Hansen, Gary D., and Edward C. Prescott. 2005. “Capacity Constraints, Asymmetries, and
the Business Cycle.” Rev. Econ. Dynam., forthcoming.
Hansen, Gary D., and Thomas J. Sargent. 1988. “Straight Time and Overtime in
Equilibrium.” J. Monetary Econ. 21 (March–May): 281–308.
Hayashi, Fumio, and Edward C. Prescott. 2002. “The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade.” 
Rev. Econ. Dynam. 5 (January): 206–235.
Heckman, James J., and Thomas E. MaCurdy. 1980. “A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour
Supply.” Rev. Econ. Studies 47 (Econometrics Issue, January): 47–74.
Hodrick, Robert J., and Edward C. Prescott. 1980. “Post-War U.S. Business Cycles: An
Empirical Investigation.” Discussion Paper 451, Northwestern University, Center for
Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. Published as Hodrick
Robert J., and Edward C. Prescott. 1997. “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical
Investigation.” J. Money, Credit, Banking 29 (February): 1–16.
Hornstein, Andreas. 1993. “Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns to Scale, and
the Importance of Productivity Shocks.” J. Monetary Econ. 31 (June): 299–316.
Hornstein, Andreas, and Edward C. Prescott. 1993. “The Firm and the Plant in General 
Equilibrium Theory.” In General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade II: The Legacy of Lionel
McKenzie, edited by Robert Becker, Michele Boldrin, Ronald Jones, and William
Thomson. San Diego: Academic Press.
Imai, Susumu, and Michael P. Keene. 2004. “Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human 
Capital Accumulation.” Int. Econ. Rev. 45 (May): 601–641.
Kehoe, Timothy J., David K. Levine, and Edward C. Prescott. 2002. “Lotteries, Sunspots,
and Incentive Constraints.” J. Econ. Theory 107 (November): 39–69.
Kehoe, Timothy J., and Edward C. Prescott. 2002. Introduction to “Great Depressions of
the 20th Century.” Rev. Econ. Dynam. 5 (January): 1–18.
Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1965. “On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth.” In Semaine
d’étude sur le role de l’analyse économétrique dans la formulation de plans de 
développement. Pontiﬁciae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia 28, 1.
Krusell, Per, and Anthony A. Smith Jr. 1998. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the
Macroeconomy.” J. Polit. Economy 106 (October): 867–896.
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott. 1977. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” J. Polit. Economy 85 (June): 473–492.
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott. 1982. “Time to Build and Aggregate 
Fluctuations.” Econometrica 50 (November): 1345–1370.
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott. 1991. “Hours and Employment Variation in
Business Cycle Theory.” Econ. Theory 1 (January): 63–82.
Long, John B., Jr., and Charles I. Plosser. 1983. “Real Business Cycles.” J. Polit. Economy 91
(February): 39–69.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1972. “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money.” J. Econ. Theory 4
(April): 103–124.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1976. “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” Carnegie-Rochester
Conf. Ser. Public Policy 1: 19–46.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1995. “Monetary Neutrality.” Nobel Prize Lecture, December 7, 1995.
www.nobelprize.org.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Edward C. Prescott. 1971. “Investment under Uncertainty.”
394
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 394Econometrica 39 (September): 659–681.
McGrattan, Ellen R., and Edward C. Prescott. 2005a. “Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of
U.S. and U.K. Corporations.” Rev. Econ. Studies 72 (July), forthcoming.
McGrattan, Ellen R., and Edward C. Prescott. 2005b. “Productivity and the Post-1990 U.S.
Economy.” Fed. Reserve Bank St. Louis Review 87 (July/August), forthcoming.
Pigou, Arthur C. 1927. Industrial Fluctuations. London: Macmillan.
Prescott, Edward C. 1986. “Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conf. Ser. Public Policy 25 (Autumn): 11–44. Reprint, 1986, Fed. Reserve Bank
Minneapolis Q. Rev. 10 (Fall): 9–22.
Prescott, Edward C. 2004. “Why Do Americans Work So Much More than Europeans?” 
Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Q. Rev. 28 (July): 2–13.
Prescott, Edward C., and Rajnish Mehra. 1980. “Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: The
Case of Homogeneous Households.” Econometrica 48 (September): 1365–1379.
Prescott, Edward C., and Karl Shell. 2002. “Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries.” 
J. Econ. Theory 107 (November): 1–10.
Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend. 1984a. “General Competitive Analysis in an
Economy with Private Information.” Int. Econ. Rev. 25 (February): 1–20.
Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend. 1984b. “Pareto Optima and Competitive
Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.” Econometrica 52 (January): 21–45.
Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor. 1994. “On the Quantitative Importance of Market Completeness.” 
J. Monetary Econ. 34 (December): 463–496.
Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor. 1995. “Models with Heterogeneous Agents.” In Frontiers of Business
Cycle Research, edited by Thomas F. Cooley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
Rogerson, Richard. 1984. Topics in the Theory of Labor Markets. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Minnesota, September.
Rogerson, Richard. 1988. “Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium.” J. Monetary Econ.
21 (January): 3–16.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1978. “The Supply of Work Schedules and Employment.” In Work Time
and Employment. Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Manpower Policy.
Rotemberg, Julio J., and Michael Woodford. 1995. “Oligopolistic Pricing and the Effects on
Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity.” J. Polit. Economy 100: 1153–1207.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Q. J. Econ. 70
(February): 65–94.
Solow, Robert M. 1970. Growth Theory: An Exposition. The Radcliffe Lectures, delivered at
the University of Warwick, 1969. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Stigler, Stephen M. 1978. “Mathematical Statistics in the Early States.” Ann. Statistics 6
(March): 239–265.
Taylor, John B. 1980. “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts.” J. Polit. Economy 88
(February): 1–23.
Thomas, Julia K. 2002. “Is Lumpy Investment Relevant for the Business Cycle?” J. Polit.
Economy 110 (June): 508–534.
Wicksell, Knut. 1907. “The Enigma of Business Cycles.” 1953 translation in Int. Econ. Papers
3: 58–74.
395
K4_40319_Prescott_358-395  05-08-18  11.41  Sida 395